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I ndonesia’s economic policies began to become much more market oriented during the 1980s.  Various policy reforms were implemented, notably in the field of international trade (Fane and Condon, 1996).  In addition, there came 
to be a new emphasis on privatisation, although this was nearly all talk and no 
action (Hill, 2000:103-5).  In 1989 the then Finance Minister announced that 52 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) would be listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange 
between 1990 and 1992 (Habir, 1990:101); in the event, almost none were.  In 
1993, the then Minister for Research and Technology, B. J. Habibie, claimed that 
a similar number could be sold quickly (McLeod, 1993:7); again, almost nothing 
came of this.  Nevertheless, although there was a conspicuous lack of progress 
with privatisation as normally conceived, there are several examples of effective 
privatisation, provided this term is interpreted sufficiently broadly. 
Approaches to Privatisation 
In the conventional sense, ‘privatisation’ refers to the sale of SOEs to the private 
sector.  The Indonesian government owns a wide range of enterprises, including 
electricity, water supply, transportation, telecommunications and construction 
companies, mining and manufacturing firms, plantations, banks, insurers, 
importers, retailers and hotels.  There is, therefore, much scope for privatisation by 
way of divestment of SOEs.   
In a broader sense, privatisation can be thought of as encouraging relatively 
greater private sector involvement in parts of the economy relative to the public 
sector.  By definition, the divestment of SOEs results in a larger share of the 
market in question being supplied by the private sector.  But this can also be 
achieved by encouraging the involvement of, and competition from, private 
enterprises in sectors where state-owned firms exist.  There was in fact quite 
considerable privatisation in Indonesia in this broader sense in the late 1980s and 
the 1990s.  We shall consider examples from three different industries in this 
paper:  banking, civil aviation and electricity.   
The Banking Sector 
Commencing in 1982 the government began to deregulate the banking sector, 
which was at that time heavily dominated by seven large state institutions:  five 
commercial banks, a savings bank and a development bank (McLeod, 1999).  
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There were many more privately owned banks, but in aggregate they accounted 
for only seven per cent of total bank assets.  In the early phases of deregulation the 
government abolished its practice of trying to impose ceilings on the growth of 
each bank’s assets, which had held back the growth of the private banks.  In the 
later phase, commencing in 1988, the government abolished barriers to entry to 
banking that for many years had prevented the establishment of new banks.  In 
addition, it removed bureaucratic obstacles to the expansion of the banks’ branch 
networks. 
The impact was dramatic (Table 1).  The number of private banks increased 
rapidly, and the number of bank branches even more so.  Other indicators, such as 
the number of savings bank accounts and the total amount of deposits of all kinds 
grew extremely rapidly as banking became much more accessible to the general 
population, and as banks offered attractive interest rates and other incentives to 
their customers.  Previously many businesses, and most individuals, had no bank 
deposits at all.  Although the existing state banks also expanded their branch 
networks and became somewhat more customer oriented, the net result was that 
the market share of the private banks grew dramatically at the expense of the state 
banks.  In other words, the industry as a whole moved in the general direction of 
privatisation, even though no state banks were sold.  In a single instance, a 
minority share (25 per cent) of Bank BNI, one of the state banks, was sold to the 
general public (in 1996).  The bank was publicly listed, but still continued to be 
thought of, and to behave, as a state-owned bank. 
Table 1:  Impact of Deregulation on Indonesia’s Private Banks 
 Dec 1988 Jun 1997 
Number  63 160 
Branches 574 4,267 
Savings accounts (million) 2.6 17.4 
Deposits (Rp trillion) 11 183 
Share of total assets (%) 24 54 
(State banks’ share of total assets, %)a 71 35 
Note a: The remaining market share was held mainly by local branches or subsidiary joint 
ventures of foreign banks. 
 
Civil Aviation 
The case of the civil aviation industry is analogous to that of the banking sector.  
For decades civil aviation was dominated by the state airline, Garuda.  A number 
of small airlines competed on a few domestic routes, but Garuda enjoyed a near 
monopoly position by virtue of being the only airline permitted to operate jet 
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aircraft.  This policy was dropped in the early 1990s, at the same time that a 
controlling private sector interest was established in a small airline, Sempati Air, 
previously owned by the military.  The new policy allowed Sempati to compete 
effectively with the poorly managed Garuda, just as banking deregulation allowed 
private banks to compete effectively with the state banks.  This new airline 
quickly established a high profile, and injected a hitherto unknown emphasis on 
concern for the travelling public.  It introduced lottery prizes for passengers, 
compensated them if departures were late, simplified and speeded up the process 
of making reservations, and so on.  The private sector market share increased 
rapidly as new domestic routes were added, eventually to be followed by the 
introduction of a few international routes.  The further benefit was to put pressure 
on Garuda to improve the quality of its own service. 
The Electricity Sector 
The sale of electricity has always been monopolised by the state electricity 
company, PLN (Perusahaan Listrik Negara).  It should be noted, however, that 
many of the larger consumers of electricity have their own generation capacity, 
because PLN has not always had a good reputation for reliability, and it has often 
been thought more economic to be self-reliant than to run the risk of incurring the 
cost of power blackouts (McCawley, 1970).  In 1990, however, the government 
announced its intention to encourage private sector involvement in the power 
generation component of this sector.  It contracted with a number of private 
consortia on a build, own and operate basis to construct some 26 new plants to 
supply electricity to the national grid.  As a result of this, perhaps a third of 
national power generating capacity (excluding generation for own use) is now in 
the hands of the private sector.  Thus, although consumers of electricity still can 
deal only with PLN as supplier, to a significant extent the ultimate source is now 
the private sector. 
The Crisis of 1997-98 and Consequent Problems with Privatisation 
Superficially, at least, Indonesia seemed to be privatising various parts of the 
economy very successfully, even if the government made very little progress by 
way of enterprise divestment.  But the process went horribly wrong when the 
economy went into crisis, along with several other Asian countries, beginning in 
1997 (McLeod, 1998). 
The Asian crisis brought an abrupt end to the rapid growth of the private 
sector’s market share in banking.  The unexpected float and large depreciation of 
the Thai baht in July 1997 resulted in a loss of confidence in the rupiah, which lost 
24 per cent of its value over the next two months alone.  This had drastic 
implications for the corporate sector, which had faced an exchange rate risk by 
virtue of having borrowed heavily in dollars rather than rupiah, often in order to 
invest in sectors producing non-tradables.  In turn, many of these dollar loans had 
been provided by domestic banks, which quickly came under pressure in the form 
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of large scale withdrawals of deposits.  Before long the central bank began to 
operate as lender of last resort, providing emergency liquidity to banks whose 
funds were being drained (Enoch et al., 2001:32).  This was not enough to stop the 
run on deposits, however, and the government eventually issued a guarantee of the 
banks’ liabilities. 
Last resort lending is not the appropriate policy when banks are clearly 
insolvent, rather than merely illiquid, of course, and all that was achieved by it 
was to delay the inevitable — and to make the eventual losses even greater.  Fane 
and McLeod (forthcoming) estimated the fiscal cost of the claims against the 
government’s guarantee of bank liabilities to be of the order of 40 per cent of 
GDP; recent developments suggest that this is likely to be an underestimate.   
Sempati Air also became bankrupt during the crisis, with debts vastly in 
excess of its assets.  An important explanation for this is that, since most of its 
sales were in the domestic market, whereas three of its major cost items — aircraft 
lease payments, debt service and aviation fuel — were dollar-denominated, it 
suffered greatly as a result of depreciation of the rupiah, just like many other firms 
producing non-tradables.  Unable to increase its airfares sufficiently — not least 
because government pressure on its major competitor, Garuda, prevented the latter 
from raising its fares as well — Sempati quickly found itself facing large negative 
cash flows that soon caused it to collapse (while government backing of Garuda 
allowed it to avoid a similar fate).  Among its very large debts were unpaid bills 
for the supply of aviation fuel by Pertamina, the government owned petroleum 
monopoly, and for the rental of airport facilities of the state-owned company, 
Angkasa Pura.  As a group, the now defunct Sempati Air plus two of its principal 
owners, the Humpuss and Nusamba conglomerates, is among the largest defaulters 
on loans from the state banks. 
The experiment with privatisation in the electricity industry has been 
similarly disastrous, resulting in huge losses to the government — albeit much 
smaller than those from the banking system.  In this case the losses are a direct 
consequence of the nature of the contracts that governed the supply of power by 
private generators to PLN.  These contracts had two crucially important features.   
First, the supply price for electricity was denominated in US dollars.  This 
meant that by 1998, after the rupiah price of US dollars had risen by a factor of 
four or five, the rupiah price of power supplied to PLN had risen in direct 
proportion.  But the political realities were such that the government felt unable to 
allow PLN to increase its prices to consumers (denominated in rupiah) 
commensurately.  Thus PLN immediately began to lose on every unit of electricity 
it purchased from the private power companies.   
Second, the contracts required PLN to ‘take or pay’.  That is, once the private 
companies had installed a certain amount of productive capacity, PLN was obliged 
to purchase all of their output, or to pay an equivalent amount if it purchased 
smaller quantities.  In the context of the unfolding economic crisis, many large 
factories and other users of electricity were cutting back their own output, and so 
their demand for electricity fell accordingly.  This further reduced PLN’s revenues 
relative to the amounts it was obliged to pay to the private producers.  The overall 
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result has been an enormous drain on the budget, to which PLN’s profits had been 
a significant contributor in better times. 
Ambivalent Ongoing Support for Privatisation 
In short, although previously these three examples of privatisation had seemed 
quite successful, with the advent of the crisis they ultimately proved to be very 
costly failures.  Nevertheless, the government is still committed to ongoing 
privatisation, especially as this is one feature of economic policy demanded by the 
IMF in return for its continued crisis-related financial support.   
It is worth noting in passing that there has been some ambivalence on this 
point, especially in relation to the banking system.  When it became clear that 
many of the banks — and all of the major banks — were insolvent, the 
government decided, in consultation with the IMF and the World Bank,1 to:  
 
• take over, or at least take a majority shareholding in, many of the large 
private banks that had failed, and recapitalise them 
• transfer the deposit liabilities of banks that were closed to state banks  
• set up what was in effect a new state-owned holding company, the Indonesian 
Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), to which were transferred all of the 
assets of banks that had been closed, along with the worst of all the non-
performing loans of the state banks and the private banks that had been 
recapitalised.   
 
The intention, nevertheless, was for these arrangements to be temporary.  
Nationalised banks were to be privatised as soon as possible; newly acquired 
government stakes in private banks were to be divested as soon as possible; the 
state banks themselves were soon to be privatised; and IBRA was to have a 
limited life of only five years during which it would sell off all of the assets it had 
acquired and then be wound up. 
There has been a disappointing lack of progress, however.  All the state banks 
are still owned by the government, and their relative importance has grown 
significantly by virtue of the large volume of deposits transferred to them from 
failed private banks.  Only one of the nationalised banks has been divested. 
This lack of progress is partly attributable to policy makers having second 
thoughts on privatisation:  given that the ‘privatisation’ that had been achieved 
prior to the crisis has turned out to be a failure, it now appears to many that 
privatisation is not so desirable after all.  To argue against privatisation for this 
reason, however, is conveniently to ignore the fact that state enterprises have fared 
no better than private during the crisis, and that their survival is attributable to the 
perceived willingness of the government to repay their debts regardless of whether 
they are insolvent.  For example, the state banks have also amassed enormous 
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losses2 — as they had done on many occasions prior to the present crisis (McLeod, 
1999:281) — as has the state-owned airline, Garuda.  Moreover, the state 
enterprises in general have always generated little by way of profit for the 
government — or have required large subsidies to keep them going (Hill, 
2000:105-7).   
Third Thoughts:  The True Rationale for Privatisation  
Privatisation in the conventional sense is undeniably important in present 
circumstances from the point of view of providing the cash flows needed to 
maintain the government’s spending programmes.  The government now faces the 
huge burden of servicing bonds it had to inject into the banks to make good their 
losses; at the same time, additional borrowing is not an option, and the scope for 
increasing tax revenues in the short term is very limited.  But cash generation is 
not the real rationale for privatisation.  After all, the only sound reason for 
converting earning assets to cash is if their return is lower than the opportunity 
cost of continuing to hold them.  In the present context, a lower bound for the 
opportunity cost is indicated by the interest rates paid on bank recapitalisation 
bonds, which could be retired using the proceeds from privatisation.  The true 
opportunity cost of funds tied up in state ownership of enterprises is somewhat 
higher than this, since the rates on these bonds are artificially low, having been set 
unilaterally by the government (McLeod, 2000:28).  If private sector owners are 
more efficient managers, the sale value of the enterprise in question will be greater 
than the present value of future returns likely to be earned with the government as 
manager.   
Thus the fundamental economic argument in favour of privatisation still 
stands.  The core of this argument is that enterprises will be managed better when 
managers have their own funds at risk, or are appointed by shareholders with a 
significant stake in the company in question.  The incentives for sound 
management of state-owned enterprises in Indonesia are largely non-existent:  the 
rule of law is very weak, and accountability of the government through the 
political processes — given an unsophisticated electorate unused to democracy — 
is also lacking. 
Unfortunately, however, this argument sits uncomfortably beside the reality 
of the failed experiments with privatisation described above.  Evidently it is 
necessary to think more carefully about the process, and to ensure that the way in 
which it is approached is consistent with this core argument.  We need to analyse 
Indonesia’s experiments with privatisation more carefully.  It is not enough to 
observe that they have failed; it is necessary to explain why they did so. 
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Analysing Indonesia’s Approach to Privatisation 
Banking:  partial divestment of a state bank 
It was mentioned briefly above that, of the seven state banks existing prior to the 
crisis, the government had only divested a small minority shareholding in one of 
them, Bank BNI.  Little, if anything, was achieved by this.  The government was 
not seriously in need of additional cash at that time, and no single private 
shareholder acquired a large enough stake to be able to exert any significant 
influence on the policies and strategies of the bank.  Presumably the government 
obtained a price per share from the divestment lower than its potential, since 
buyers would have realised that the introduction of new management capable of 
extracting greater value from the bank’s assets was not in prospect.  Bank BNI 
gained some notoriety during the crisis by virtue of having provided well over 
$US1 billion of loans to a single conglomerate, Texmaco, which is now by far the 
single largest debtor to IBRA by virtue of defaulting on these loans (Fane, 
2000a:29-30).  It was revealed in 2000 by the then Minister for State Enterprises 
that these loans had been provided by instruction of the former president, 
Soeharto.  In other words, having a significant but fragmented minority private 
sector shareholding in the bank did nothing to offset the debilitating influence of 
the politically powerful.   
It is clear what went wrong in this example of ‘privatisation’.  Partial 
divestment of the government’s shares did not result in any private owner having a 
sufficiently large stake in the bank to provide the incentive and the ability to 
exercise strong influence on its management.  The managers of the bank continued 
to have weak incentives to strive for high profits relative to their incentives to act 
in the interests of other parties such as political patrons, favoured borrowers, 
friends and relatives. 
Banking:  private sector expansion 
In the case of privatisation of the banking sector by allowing the private sector to 
expand its market share at the expense of state banks, the explanation for the 
unsatisfactory outcome of the experiment is also closely related to the failure to 
ensure that the approach was consistent with the core argument in favour of 
privatisation.  Specifically, the government failed to ensure that the owners of the 
private banks had significant amounts of their own wealth at risk.  There were two 
reasons for this.   
First, the prudential regulations called for banks to observe a minimum 
capital adequacy ratio (CAR, the ratio of capital to risk weighted assets) of only 8-
9 per cent.3  This reflects an extremely high gearing ratio (that is, ratio of debt to 
equity) relative to the norms of the corporate sector outside banking.  The only 
                                                     
3  The minimum CAR was in the process of being raised in stages from eight per cent to 
12 per cent. It became nine per cent in September 1997, just as the crisis was getting under 
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obvious explanation for creditors of banks — primarily, their depositors — being 
willing to accept such a small level of equity to protect themselves against 
potential losses incurred by the banks is that there is a perception that the 
government will step in to provide such protection if necessary.  When the crisis 
struck this is precisely what it did, despite frequent denials previously that it 
provided any kind of guarantee of the safety of bank deposits. 
As we have seen, the banks made skilful use of this perception of an implicit 
government guarantee by actively marketing their deposit products, opening many 
new branches and offering high interest rates and other benefits such as lottery 
prizes.  The implicit government guarantee amounted to a subsidy, and the more 
deposits that could be mobilised, the greater its total value.  In turn, much of the 
subsidy found its way to borrowers, who were able to borrow at lower rates than if 
it had not existed.   
Second, the government permitted banks to lend to affiliated parties — 
roughly speaking, to companies owned by the same people.  The prudential 
regulations attempted to limit this practice by imposing a ceiling on loans to 
affiliates as a proportion of banks’ capital.  The constraint was lax in itself by 
international standards, but in any case, banks flouted these lending limits with 
impunity:  the central bank, in its capacity as prudential regulator, seemingly did 
nothing to enforce its own regulation.   
The effect of banks lending to their own affiliates is to reduce the amount of 
funds of the owner genuinely at risk.  Suppose that an owner subscribes $1 million 
as equity in the bank, but then makes a loan to himself of $1 million.  If he fails to 
repay the loan there is then effectively no equity cushion for the benefit of the 
bank’s creditors if it gets into trouble.  If the bank were to be wound up, the 
depositors would need to try to recover the loan from the owner through the 
courts, but this may be exceedingly difficult — especially if the loan 
documentation is inadequate and collateral of low value or non-existent.  In a 
country in which the legal system is inefficient, lacking in competence, and highly 
corrupt, the chance of success would be negligible.  The owner could expect to 
escape with his million dollars intact and, given the extreme political pressure on 
the government to protect depositors, the effect would be to shift the banks’ losses 
to taxpayers.  This precisely describes what has happened in countless cases in 
Indonesia during the crisis.   
Civil Aviation 
Disparate though the two sectors may be, the failure of privatisation in civil 
aviation occurred for much the same reason as that in banking — namely, the 
failure to ensure that the private sector owners of Sempati had a significant 
amount of their own wealth at risk.  In this case there also appears to have been 
what amounted to an implicit government guarantee that allowed the company to 
build up large and practically unsecured debts to its major suppliers and 
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financiers.4  Alternatively, it could be said that the losses to the state in this case 
derived from the poor business practices of various state-owned enterprises:  the 
state banks that lent to Sempati; the state petroleum company that supplied it with 
fuel on credit; and the state-owned airports that failed to collect rent payments 
from it.  In this sense, the failure of civil aviation privatisation stems not from the 
new private sector competitor, but from grossly deficient management (no doubt 
the result of political interference) of state enterprises with which it had significant 
business relationships.   
Electricity sector 
Although the task of power generation was partly turned over to the private sector, 
again this was not done in a manner consistent with the core argument in favour of 
privatisation.  The private sector members of the various consortia that constructed 
power generation plants did have large amounts of their own funds at risk, but two 
of the major risks themselves were shifted to the government — consistent with 
the notion of ‘privatisation of profits and socialisation of losses’.  First, there was 
the risk that the demand for power from each new plant would be significantly less 
than its supply capacity, either because aggregate demand for electricity had been 
overestimated, or because of the large number of new generators being 
constructed.  By accepting ‘take or pay’ contracts in its negotiations with the new 
private operators, the government allowed this risk to be shifted to itself.  Second, 
there was the exchange rate risk, reflecting the possibility that the government 
might not always persevere with its policy of slowly but steadily depreciating the 
rupiah against the US dollar (McLeod, 1997:33).  By virtue of PLN’s acceptance 
of dollar-denominated prices for electricity, this risk was also shifted to the 
government; the outcome of negotiations over contract details no doubt had much 
to do with the identity of the domestic partners in each of the consortia, all of 
whom were either relatives or cronies of the president (Thirwell, 2001).  In short, 
the requirement that the risks of the business in question would be carried by its 
private sector owners was violated in these two very important respects.   
One of the principal reasons why government-owned businesses make losses 
is that they are always under political pressure to hold their selling prices down, 
even though their costs may be rising.  There are also pressures to hold buying 
prices (such as wages) up, and to extend excessive amounts of credit for lengthy 
terms and without adequate security.  In the private sector, firms are generally free 
to put up their prices and, although this may meet with opposition from their 
customers, there is little to fear except if the price increases are intended to offset 
inefficiency or to earn excessive profits.  In these cases the firms can expect to 
lose market share to more efficient and less avaricious competitors, but private 
sector firms are far less vulnerable than SOEs to interference from politicians 
                                                     
4  In Indonesia’s weak and corrupt legal environment it has been common for borrowers 
to divert cash revenues to related companies in such a manner as to be unrecoverable by 
creditors.  It is noteworthy that Sempati was declared bankrupt at its own request, not that 
of its creditors. 
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worried about being voted out of office if prices increase.  Thus privatisation of 
power generation in Indonesia can be said to have failed because the approach 
followed did nothing to deal with this intrusion of politics into commercial 
decision-making, resulting in the transfer of financial risks from the private 
producers to the government through PLN.   
Making Privatisation Work 
Banking 
The government’s stated intention is to return ownership of the wholly or largely 
nationalised former private banks to the private sector, and to sell off the state 
banks.  Obviously it is important that the previous mistakes with privatisation are 
not repeated.  Action is required on several fronts to avoid the kinds of outcomes 
described above, by ensuring that private bank owners have significant amounts of 
their own capital at risk.   
First, much higher standards for capital adequacy need to be set.  It is 
arguable that the CAR of eight per cent prescribed in the international convention 
known as the Basle Accord (Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, 1988) is 
too low, even in developed economies.  An important purpose of capital, or equity, 
in all businesses is to provide a cushion of safety to creditors.  Clearly this cushion 
needs to be larger when the risks are relatively large, which is certainly the case in 
Indonesia (and probably in developing countries in general), where political 
stability cannot be taken for granted, the legal system is exceedingly weak, and the 
economy is vulnerable to negative shocks of various kinds.  On this basis, Fane 
(2000b:127-30) argues in favour of a CAR of at least 16 per cent for economies 
similar to Indonesia. 
Second, much greater care needs to be taken in measuring and defining 
capital for the purpose of calculating the CAR.  A more realistic approach is called 
for, in which assets are marked to market frequently, and adequate provisions for 
loan losses are created in timely fashion whenever there are indications that 
particular loans may not be repaid in full.  In addition, capital should be defined to 
exclude the value of loans or any other kind of exposure of the bank to affiliated 
companies.  In the previous example of a bank with equity of $1 million that lent 
$1 million to a firm controlled by its owner, the bank’s capital would be recorded 
as zero for regulatory purposes, because the $1 million loan to its owner would be 
offset against the $1 million of equity.  This would have the desirable impact of 
removing the incentive to set up banks for the main purpose of obtaining cheap 
finance for affiliated companies by exploiting the implicit government guarantee 
of bank safety. 
Third, the prudential regulator should be far more active in requiring 
corrective action from banks whose capital adequacy falls below the specified 
minimum.  There should be very little regulatory forbearance:  owners should be 
required to repair any capital deficiency without delay.  If they failed to do so the 
bank should be taken out of their control and sold to another party, who would be 
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required either to build up the bank’s capital immediately or to liquidate it.  If the 
bank continued to operate, the original owners should receive the purchase price 
paid by the new owner.  If it were liquidated, they should receive nothing (Fane 
and McLeod, 2002). 
Fourth, given the apparent impossibility of persuading the general public that 
the government will not make good their deposits in cases where banks fail, it 
would also seem sensible to implement a system of deposit insurance, provided it 
is operated on genuine market principles.  Banks would need to pay insurance 
premia that reflected the insuring institution’s assessment of the risk of failure of 
each bank:  the insurer should not be subsidised in any way by the government.  
Under such arrangements it could be expected that insurance premia would be 
inversely related to capital adequacy:  the higher the bank’s capital relative to risk 
assets, the lower the risk to the insurer, and the lower the insurance premium.  
This would provide a market-based incentive to maintain higher CARs, rather than 
relying purely on enforcement by the prudential regulator.  Indeed, with deposit 
insurance it would be sensible for the insurer to become, in effect, the prudential 
regulator, since it would have a relatively strong incentive to enforce prudential 
regulations:  these would simply become part of the terms and conditions of the 
insurance contract. 
There is no reason why the deposit insurance institution or institutions should 
be owned by the government.  Indeed, given Indonesia’s long history of poor 
management of state-owned financial institutions (not least as a result of heavy 
political interference) there is a strong argument for requiring them to be owned 
by international entities of strong repute, or simply to require the banks to 
purchase insurance from such entities abroad (Schmulow, forthcoming).  In this 
manner, the government could avoid almost the entire need to be involved with 
the prudential regulation of banks, and it could almost entirely remove the risk of 
having to bail out banks’ depositors again:  it could simply require each bank to be 
properly insured by an approved foreign insurer (and draw up a list of approved 
institutions for that purpose).  This would be a genuinely market-oriented 
approach to privatisation of the banking system, similar to the recent emergence of 
insured investment funds in the Australian capital market. 
Civil aviation 
The first best policy here would be for the government to fully divest itself of 
Garuda and to open up the industry to new competitors, including foreign airlines; 
there is no sound justification for having a government-owned airline.  If the 
government thinks it necessary to have aircraft serving particular routes that would 
not be commercially viable it can easily provide an explicit subsidy to a private 
airline to do so — and justify this policy to the electorate.  In addition, it will be 
essential to ensure that other government entities provide no hidden subsidies, and 
avoid significant financial exposures, to private airlines.  For example, Pertamina 
should insist on some arrangement such as regular weekly payments for fuel not 
more than, say, one month in arrears; likewise the airport management company 
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should insist on payment of rent in advance for premises and other facilities on, 
say, a monthly basis.  (Better still, Pertamina and Angkasa Pura should also be 
divested.  And if the plan to fully privatise the banking system comes to pass, then 
of course there will be no possibility of loan defaults by airlines at government 
banks.) 
Electricity 
A range of issues relating to future private sector involvement in the electricity 
sector need to be addressed if this is to be successful.  The most immediate 
question is whether there is really an actual or incipient shortage of power 
generation capacity, as has been suggested often in recent times (McBeth, 2001).  
This is such a marked reversal from the story early in the crisis — when the major 
concern was with excess generating capacity after dramatic expansion of private 
facilities — that it seems more likely a reflection of artificially boosted demand 
resulting from a significant reduction in the real price of power to consumers 
(because of the government’s unwillingness to raise prices in line with cost 
increases).  If this is the case, the appropriate policy change is to adjust prices 
upward immediately in order to reflect the real cost of power production.   
A second desirable change in relation to electricity generation would be for 
PLN’s own existing production capacity to be sold to the private sector.  Just as 
with banking and civil aviation, there is no sound reason to have a state-owned 
firm competing with private firms in power generation.  In the course of divesting 
existing generators the government would need to come to grips with the 
appropriate form of contracts for the purchase of electricity by PLN.  It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to canvass the wide range of possibilities (which also 
encompass divestment of the national grid and handing over the retailing function 
to the private sector)5; suffice it to say that a major objective should be to ensure 
that the commercial risks of producing power are borne by the suppliers.   
One benefit of divesting existing plants (through an open tendering process) 
is that this would reveal a reasonable supply price, or set of prices, for electricity.  
This could provide a basis for renegotiation of the contracts with existing private 
producers.  These contracts not only shift major commercial risks to the 
government, but also specify prices well in excess of those that can be observed in 
other markets, reflecting the failure of the then government to ensure competitive 
tendering for the right to become a supplier to PLN and, related to this, the 
presence of Soeharto cronies and family members in all the joint venture consortia 
involved (Bosshard, 2000).  The present government has already found that 
attempting to renegotiate these essentially corrupt contracts is fraught with danger, 
as the foreign partners are sufficiently influential to be able to rely on the support 
of their own, very powerful, governments in the US, Japan, Germany and the UK 
(Murphy, 1999).  Nevertheless, its political position will be considerably 
                                                     
5  PLN has already talked of moving in these directions (Motoyama and Widagdo, 
1999:10-11), though its plans seem naively optimistic given Indonesia’s lack of 
achievement hitherto with privatisation. 
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strengthened if it can present strong evidence that the existing contracts are 
grossly overpriced. 
Conclusions 
The divestment of state enterprises is not the only way to privatise industries.  In 
Indonesia, privatisation has involved processes by which private sector 
involvement increases significantly without very much state enterprise divestment, 
despite the wide scope for it and despite the stated intention of successive 
governments to undertake such divestment.  Considerable gains can be achieved 
by encouraging private sector involvement in this manner, whereas achieving 
similar gains simply by transferring ownership of existing state enterprises to 
private owners might face significant political obstacles.   
Nevertheless, the experience of the last few years has shown that the devil is 
in the detail so far as privatisation is concerned:  there are very significant dangers 
from privatisation, of whatever kind, if the core rationale for it is not kept clearly 
in mind.  Specifically, the private sector is not necessarily more likely than the 
public sector to ensure that the enterprise is managed well unless the owners have 
a significant amount of their own funds at risk, and unless the major risks of the 
enterprise remain with its owners rather than being transferred back to the 
government in some manner.  In short, Indonesia’s second thoughts on 
privatisation are well justified.  Nevertheless, the correct conclusion to be drawn 
from recent experience is not that privatisation should be abandoned, but that 
implementation in a manner consistent with its fundamental rationale is essential.   
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